

VIA:

(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. EASA-100

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE
Attention: ☐
FROM : Chief of Station, Vienna

DATE: 3 December 1952SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/GROOVY

NOT SUITABLE FOR MICROFILM

SPECIFIC— BOEHM/HOETTL ContactRef: EASA-205, EASA-225, EASA-372, EASA-384, EASA-82

1. Attached hereto is photocopy of the Detachment 35 report which was the basis for our EASA-384. The source is Carlo HASS.

2. Without revealing the source, the report was shown to GROSSBAHN. All agreed this was the final straw; there was no further point in attempting to explain away or rationalize the BOEHM/HOETTL relationship. What remained to be done was to determine the extent of possible damage to GROSSBAHN operations. Just how to go about this was something we were trying to study out carefully and had tentatively decided to use an alleged routine Carriage re-test as the opening wedge in breaking BOEHM on his relationship with HOETTL. This seemed desirable in order to protect our cross check on HOETTL through Detachment 35's HASS.

3. It was further planned to have GROSSBAHN conduct the interrogation of BOEHM, with the aid of ☐ and Carriage. The Case Officer was not to sit in on the actual interrogations, but would go over the results with GROSSBAHN and ☐ and help plan the course of the operation.

4. We have been in touch with ☐ by telephone and he has advised us that the earliest he could possibly come to Salzburg was about 20 January 1953. This seemed stretching out an imposing security problem a bit far and we were toying with the idea of substituting the local CID Carriage man for ☐ as the machine and operator are actually not necessary to the operation except for the purpose of giving us a plausible excuse for getting tough when BOEHM, as he inevitably must, goes even more sour on the HOETTL question than he did at the last run. We certainly would like to have ☐ with his well rounded interrogative experience, present at the session with BOEHM, but we cannot see waiting until 20 January before taking any action.

5. Now a new facet has cropped up. BOEHM himself dropped a bombshell in our midst by offering his resignation. A copy of his letter is attached, dated 28 November, which reached GROSSBAHN via mail

RI COPY

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

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3 Dec 52
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SECRET
- 2 -

at his home on 29 November 1952. GROSSBAHN presented it to us on 1 December and swears by all that's Holy that he had nothing to do with inducing this action at this particular time. He claims he did not disclose to BOEHM by word or by his actions that anything was amiss. We must accept GROSSBAHN's plea of innocence, but continue to wonder if possibly something might not have leaked to BOEHM through the Detachment 35 end. We, of course, cannot say and are not in a position to make any inquiries.

6. The resignation, notwithstanding, does not alter the fact that we still feel BOEHM must be subjected to a complete debriefing on exactly what he has passed to HOETTL on GROSSBAHN operations. We now apparently have a solid reason for demanding that he agree to a re-test under the pretext of it being a routine procedure in the case of resignations. We will try to work out the question of C. J.'s coming to Salzburg at an earlier date with MOB. If this cannot be done, we plan to go ahead with the idea of using local CID personnel and facilities.

7. When we are through with BOEHM, the parting can not be anything but unfriendly. This brings up the problems of control over him after he has been completely severed from GROSSBAHN. We are studying this problem, discussing it with GROSSBAHN and will submit our recommendation in our next dispatch on the matter. GROSSBAHN states that he has plenty of "dirt" (wine, women and song affairs) on BOEHM, which means we might be able to do one of two things; after the interrogation, we can offer BOEHM a few samples and tell him emphatically that more will be forthcoming in the proper quarters if he so much as takes a small step out of line; or we could begin to discredit him, without the direct threat, in his police, Church, and political circles, so that his chances of gaining sympathetic or believing ear will be sharply reduced. In any event, we are not too happy with either solution and hope that further discussions with GROSSBAHN will offer a better solution on the problem of after-control, which is inevitably a sticky one.

8. We wish to reiterate a point which we made, perhaps too indirectly, in EASA-205; that is, HASS is doing this monitoring of HOETTL strictly on his own. He is getting no direction from Detachment 35 and probably for the lack of something better to do (plus the fact that he is enough of a pro to recognise an intelligence tid-bit when he sees one) is making capital of his contact with HOETTL. We, of course, are not expressing any undue amount of interest to Detachment 35, merely expressing our gratitude when they call one of HASS' reports to our attention.

9. Your EASA-82 arrived here just as we were finishing up the rough draft of this dispatch. We offer our compliments for the excellent job represented in your memo. The thoughtfulness with which it was prepared is proven by the revelation of events as detailed herein.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

285

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

- 3 -

Some of the points you raise are answered in the foregoing; others can only be answered with the completion of BOEHM's interrogation, and still others we are a long way from answering. For example, you bring up the possibility of a GROSSBAHN/HOETTL tie. We can only say that we can not close our eyes to this thought in this or any future possibilities for checking this out that might crop up in the GROSSBAHN operations. BOEHM's connecting up with Bonn when dropped by GROSSBAHN seems to be a bridge we will have to cross if and when we come to it. We have already asked GROSSBAHN to do a complete study on the security implication surrounding BOEHM's infidelity, which means we must get a thorough run-down on his present duties as well as the type of material to which he has had access.

10. Any comments or suggestions Headquarters might have on the foregoing are requested by cable as we plan to try to bring off BOEHM's interrogation before the coming Holiday season.

11. Note for [] As you can see, this is a most serious security problem and could possibly mean that HOETTL has been reading much more of our GROSSBAHN operation than we suppose at the moment. Request that you advise us by phone what you might be able to work out on coming to Salzburg before the end of December 1952.

L @ M. [] *CHL*

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